Solving the "Right" Problems

Question: Why do major global organizations fail to have major national impact in Haiti?

Answer: They seek to solve the wrong problems.

Haiti has not come far in the 202 years since its independence. Some would argue that it has taken steps backward in the last half of the 20th century. The lack of progress in the second oldest independent republic in the Western Hemisphere is truly shocking... especially in consideration of its proximity to the United States. So what gives?

Nicholas Eberstaldt , Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at American Enterprise Institute (AEI), writes eloquently of his visit to Port-au-Prince this past summer. In his recent publication he paints a positively tragic portrait of the Haitian capital that might be unbelievable to any who have never visited a Third World country:

...Port-au-Prince is not too poor to have sewage: That humid choking stench is
everywhere. Unending makeshift shacks stretch from clogged "canals," through
which water the color of petroleum slowly trickles: This is at once the communal
latrine and the water supply for washing the evening's cookware.

This is one of several other descriptions in the article that serve to show the reader the unimaginable extent of the need in Haiti. Eberstaldt points out the major global organizations in play. Of the UN troops sent through MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) he remarks, "As for MINUSTAH and their 8,800 soldiers and police, some Haitians have taken to calling them TOURISTAH," which completely validates my observations in the south. According to him and others, the Haitian government and other legal statutes limit UN's efficacy. The troops often end up with much time to lounge.

Eberstaldt also notes the long term monetary commitment of both USAID and World Bank to the island nation over the years:

Haiti received a cumulative total of about $3.5 billion (in 2004
dollars) in American aid (economic and security assistance) between 1946 and
2004--that is to say, over the roughly six decades in which its per capita
output achieved a decline of 25 percent. U.S. aid, moreover, was just one of
many sources of concessional official transfers to Haiti. According to the World
Bank, since 1969, Haiti has enjoyed a cumulative total of $8.3 billion in
official development assistance (measured in 2004 dollars).

So in addition to troops, Haiti has access to funds. Does the money go to provide for the poor, feed the hungry, shelter the homeless, heal the sick, protect the vulnerable and educate the ignorant? It does not appear to.

The smaller grassroots non-profits make the greatest direct impact in improving the lives of Haitians. Eberstaldt's "Haiti in Extremis" mentions those few he noticed in Port-au-Prince - GHESKIO HIV Clinic, Mother Teresa's Missionaries of Charity - but there are others both in the capital and the country: Theo's Work in Les Cayes and Paul Farmer's Partners in Health in central Haiti, to name a couple. These organizations fill in where the government and larger non-profits fail.

AEI's political economy scholar points out a little discussed but enormously important fact: None of the efforts of Haitians or outside groups will stick without the security to protect them. This is where larger entities can do the most - and the U.S. may wish to take heed due to Haiti's proximity and reputation for hosting drug-runners. To end on a dreary note:

Without security, efforts to better the national plight will be
doomed to frustration, or worse. Foreign economic assistance will be mainly
wasted, or worse. Humanitarian assistance efforts will find themselves on an
endless treadmill. Economic and humanitarian assistance are no substitute for
security and safety--cannot substitute for it, cannot themselves create it. And
what holds for Haiti holds just as true for other tortured regions of the world
where governments receive foreign aid, but local populations do not receive
safety.